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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this consolidated appeal, Victor McDene Applewhaite 
and Lydia Grouby Romero allege that their conviction for 
numerous federal and territorial crimes must be reversed 
because the evidence presented at their joint trial was 
insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Appellants also challenge their convictions on constitutional grounds, 
but those arguments require little discussion. Romero relies upon United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549 (1995), to argue that Congress exceeded 
its authority under the Commerce Clause in enacting 18 U. S. C. S 2119. 
However, two months after the Court decided Lopez, we rejected an 
identical challenge to the carjacking statute. In United States v. Bishop, 
66 F.3d 569, 590 (3d Cir. 1995) we held, inter alia, that because motor 
 
                                2 
  
The defendants were convicted of conspiracy in violation 
18 U. S. C. S 371 (Count 1); carjacking in violation 18 U. S. 
C. S 2119(2) (Count 2); hindering the communication of 
information relating to the commission of a federal offense 
violation of 18 U. S. C. S 1512(b)(3) (Count 3); and 
destruction of evidence in violation of 18 U. S. C. 
S 1512(b)(2)(B) (Count 4). They were also convicted of the 
territorial crimes of attempted first degree murder in 
violation of 14 V. I. C. SS 922(a)(1), 331 and 11 (Count 5) 
and kidnapping in violation of 14 V. I. C. #8E8E # 1051 and 11 
(Count 6). We agree that the evidence presented at trial was 
insufficient to support the defendants' convictions for 
carjacking under 18 U. S. C. S 2119(2) (Count 2), and we 
will therefore reverse as to that count of the indictment. 
However, we will affirm as to the remaining counts. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
vehicles are "instrumentalities of interstate commerce," it was within 
Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause to "criminalize activities 
affecting their use even though the wrongful conduct, such as 
carjacking, occurs wholly intrastate." Moreover, we note that seven other 
circuit courts of appeals have held that Lopez does not undermine the 
constitutional validity of the 18 U. S. C. S 2119. See United States v. 
Rivera-Figueroa, 149 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. Romero, 122 
F.3d 1334 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, ___ U. S. ___, 118 S. Ct. 1310 
(1998); United States v. Hicks, 103 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 1996); United 
States v. McHenry, 97 F.3d 125 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Coleman, 78 F.3d 154 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Hutchinson, 75 
F.3d 626 (11th Cir. 1996); and United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 234 
(8th Cir. 1995). 
 
Applewhaite also argues that the witness tampering statute, 18 U. S. 
C. S 1512, is unconstitutionally "overbroad," as applied to him, because 
the government "has suggested" that the statute is not limited to the 
federal charges but to the territorial charges as well. Applewhaite's Br. 
at 
8-9. His argument is without merit. The witness tampering statute's 
reach is limited to tampering that "affects a federal proceeding or 
investigation," United States v. Bell, 113 F.3d 1345, 1348 (3d Cir. 1997), 
and Applewhaite has not pointed to anything in the record that would 
indicate that the government suggested otherwise. Moreover, here, the 
District Court clearly instructed the jury that the witness tampering 
charges applied only to the federal charge of carjacking. Jt. App. at 
500a-502a. As discussed infra, the prosecution's failure to prove the 
federal offense of carjacking does not negate the fact that the 
prosecution for that offense was a "federal proceeding" under S 1512. 
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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND. 
 
Were this case not so tragic, it could quite properly be 
classified as "A Comedy of Errors." Lydia and Eddie Romero 
had been married for approximately 17 years. The events 
that underlie this appeal clearly show that theirs was not 
the happiest of relationships. As of April, 1997 they had 
been separated for about two years and the period of their 
separation had been marked by rancorous arguments and 
violence as well as allegations that Lydia had threatened to 
kill, and had assaulted Eddie. Lydia, who was a Virgin 
Islands Police Officer, had become romantically involved 
with Victor Applewhaite, who was also a Virgin Islands 
Police Officer. 
 
In the morning of April 19, 1997, Lydia Romero and 
Eddie Romero had a heated argument about the latter's 
delinquency in his child support and mortgage payments. 
That evening, Lydia Romero telephoned Eddie Romero and 
told him to come immediately to her home because she 
needed to speak to him about their daughter. Eddie Romero 
asked if the matter could wait until the following day, but 
Lydia insisted that it was important that they speak then. 
Consequently, Eddie drove his white van to Lydia's home. 
 
When he arrived, Lydia was waiting outside in the front 
yard. Eddie got out of his van and rested against it near a 
small gate in a stone wall. The wall separated Eddie from 
Lydia. Lydia told Eddie to wait outside the stone wall until 
she penned the dogs; however, she made no move to pen 
the dogs. Rather, she remained in place, staring at Eddie 
Romero. As she stood staring at Eddie, he was knocked 
unconscious by three blows from behind. 
 
Jean and Marie Hepburn lived across the street from 
Lydia Romero. During the night of April 19th going into the 
morning of April 20th, Jean Hepburn was awakened by 
barking dogs. He also heard something that sounded like 
someone being beaten with a stick or a bat, and, two or 
three minutes later, he heard the sound of Lydia Romero's 
Ford Explorer leaving the area, only to return about thirty 
minutes later. Marie, Jean's wife, was also awakened by the 
barking dogs and also heard something that sounded like 
someone being hit with a stick. A little later she heard a car 
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leave, and, within two minutes she heard Lydia Romero's 
Explorer leave. About one half-hour later she also heard 
Romero's Explorer return. 
 
Sometime after being knocked unconscious, Eddie 
Romero awoke inside his van to see Applewhaite driving the 
van. Applewhaite had his left hand on the steering wheel, 
and he was holding a gun in his right hand. As Eddie 
regained consciousness, he and Applewhaite began to 
struggle as he attempted to grab Applewhaite's gun. As they 
wrestled for the gun, Eddie Romero was shot. Applewhaite, 
who was unable to drive, control the gun, and wrestle with 
Romero at the same time, lost control of the van which 
crashed into surrounding vegetation. After the crash, 
Applewhaite got out of the van, turned and fired two more 
bullets into Eddie Romero, and then ran from the scene. 
Police later discovered a bloody baseball bat and latex 
gloves in the well below the driver's seat of the van, and 
Applewhaite's fingerprints were recovered from the van's 
hood. 
 
Fortunately for Romero, Applewhaite was no better at 
aiming a gun than he was at kidnapping or driving a 
"getaway" car. Accordingly, none of the bullets that 
Applewhaite fired into Romero were fatal. Romero was 
treated for 3 bullet wounds, shock, blunt force trauma that 
was consistent with having been struck with a baseball bat, 
and released from the hospital. 
 
At approximately 4:00 a.m. the day after Romero was 
assaulted, Lydia Romero contacted another Virgin Islands 
police officer, Akeem Newton, and told him that she had 
heard on the radio that Eddie Romero had been beaten-up. 
Newton went immediately to Lydia Romero's house. There, 
he noticed that the stone wall in front of the house had 
recently been painted. Later that morning, Newton had 
seen Lydia Romero painting the wall and plantingflowers in 
the earth abutting it. At Lydia Romero's urging, Newton had 
helped her plant flowers. 
 
The Hepburns also saw Lydia Romero painting the stone 
wall. Jean Hepburn saw Lydia Romero standing by her 
front gate with a bucket, cleaning the stone wall in front of 
her house with a rag or a chamois after he got out of bed 
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on the morning of April 20th. Shortly thereafter, he saw "a 
young Spanish guy by the street with a pick digging, 
planting flowers and [Lydia] Romero was there with -- they 
was painting the wall." Joint Appendix at 41a. About 7:00 
a. m. on the morning of April 20th, Marie Hepburn also saw 
a "young Puerto Rican guy" painting the wall and saw Lydia 
Romero planting flowers in front of the wall. Id. at 62-63. 
The stone fence had never previously been painted during 
the 18 years the Hepburns lived across the street from 
Lydia Romero. Forensic analysis later revealed Eddie 
Romero's blood on the stone wall and in the soil beneath it.2 
 
On the morning of April 20th, Lydia Romero told Newton 
that she was concerned that Eddie Romero might try to 
implicate her in the attack; and that if anyone asked, he 
(Newton) should say that he spent the preceding night with 
her. Later that day, Applewhaite contacted Newton, and 
informed him that Lydia Romero had been arrested. 
Applewhaite also reminded Newton of Lydia's request that 
Newton tell anyone who inquired that Lydia and Newton 
had spent the night together. 
 
Lydia Romero and Applewhaite were subsequently 
indicted for the aforementioned violations of federal and 
territorial law and jointly tried before a jury. Lydia Romero 
did not testify at trial. However, Applewhaite did testify. He 
admitted hitting Eddie Romero with the baseball bat, but 
he testified that he did so because Eddie was threatening 
Lydia with a gun. Applewhaite explained that when he 
realized what he had done, he put on the latex gloves that 
he retrieved from Lydia's car, and he then put Eddie 
Romero in Eddie's own van in order to take him to the 
hospital. According to Applewhaite's testimony, Eddie woke- 
up as he was being taken to the hospital, a struggle 
ensued, and a gun that Applewhaite just happened to be 
holding went off. The jury rejected Applewhaite's version of 
what happened and convicted both defendants of all 
charges. This appeal followed.3 We will limit our discussion 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Counsel stipulated that the blood that was recovered from the wall 
and the soil was that of Eddie Romero. 
 
3. The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 4 V. I. C. S 32 and 48 
U. S. C. S 1612(a) and (c). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U. S. C. 
S 1291. 
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to the defendants' attack upon the sufficiency of the 
evidence. 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
 
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a 
conviction we review the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the government as verdict winner. United 
States v. Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909, 911 (3d Cir. 1996). "We 
must affirm the convictions if a rational trier of fact could 
have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and the verdict is supported by substantial evidence." 
United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1243 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
III. FEDERAL CONVICTIONS. 
 
A. Conspiracy. 
 
We begin our discussion with the defendants' assertion 
that there was insufficient evidence to support their 
conspiracy convictions. Count 1 of the superseding 
indictment charged that Romero and Applewhaite agreed 
with each other to commit three related federal crimes, viz., 
(1) carjacking; (2) hindering the communication of 
information relating to the commission of a federal offense; 
and (3) destruction of evidence to be used in an official 
proceeding. Section 371 of Title 18 provides, in relevant 
part, that "[i]f two or more persons conspire to commit any 
offense against the United States, . . . and one or more of 
such persons do any act to effect the object of the 
conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 
 
"In a conspiracy indictment, the gist of the offense is the 
agreement and specific intent to commit an unlawful act, 
and when required by statute, an overt act." United States 
v. Wander, 601 F.2d 1251, 1259 (3d Cir. 1979). Here, the 
defendants challenge only the first element of their 
conspiracy convictions. They argue that the government did 
not prove an illicit agreement beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Thus, we must determine if the evidence at trial would have 
allowed a reasonable juror to conclude beyond a reasonable 
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doubt that the defendants "shared a unity of purpose, [or] 
the intent to achieve a common goal and an agreement to 
work together toward the goal." United States v. Wexler, 838 
F.2d 88, 90-91 (3d Cir. 1988) (citation and internal 
quotations omitted). 
 
The defendants correctly note that there is no direct 
evidence of any agreement between them to commit any 
acts furthering any of the three objects of the conspiracy. 
However, direct evidence is not required. Although each 
element of a criminal conspiracy must be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, each may be proven entirely by 
circumstantial evidence, United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 
309, 321 (3d Cir. 1992). The law merely requires that "the 
inferences drawn must have a logical and convincing 
connection to the facts established." United States v. 
Casper, 956 F.2d 416, 422 (3d Cir. 1992). Accordingly, we 
must examine the evidence that was presented as to each 
of the substantive crimes that the government alleged as 
objects of the conspiracy and determine if the quantum of 
evidence supports each of their convictions. 
 
1. Carjacking. 
 
In order to be convicted of carjacking under 18 U. S. C. 
S 2119,4 the government"must prove that the defendant (1) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The text of the carjacking statute provides: 
 
       Whoever, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm 
       takes a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or 
       received in interstate or foreign commerce from the person or 
       presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation, or 
       attempts to do so, shall-- 
 
       (1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, 
       or both, 
 
       (2) if serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this 
title, 
       including any conduct that, if the conduct occurred in the special 
       maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, would 
       violate section 2241 or 2242 of this title) results, be fined under 
this 
       title or imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both, and 
 
       (3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for 
any 
       number of years up to life, or both, or sentenced to death. 
 
18 U. S. C. S 2119. 
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with intent to cause death or serious bodily harm (2) took 
a motor vehicle (3) that had been transported, shipped or 
received in interstate or foreign commerce (4) from the 
person or presence of another (5) by force and violence or 
intimidation." United States v. Lake, 150 F.2d 269, 272 (3d 
Cir. 1998)(internal quotations omitted). 
 
In Holloway v. United States, ___ U. S. ___, 119 S. Ct. 
966 (1999) the Supreme Court clarified the mens rea 
required for carjacking. 
 
       [t]he intent requirement of S 2119 is satisfied when the 
       Government proves that at the moment the defendant 
       demanded or took control over the driver's automobile, 
       the defendant possessed the intent to seriously harm 
       or kill the driver if necessary to steal the car (or, 
       alternatively, if unnecessary to steal the car). 
 
119 S. Ct. at 972 (emphasis added). Thus, the statute 
 
       directs the factfinder's attention to the defendant's 
       state of mind at the precise moment he demanded or 
       took control over the car "by force and violence or by 
       intimidation." If the defendant has the proscribed state 
       of mind at that moment, the statute's scienter element 
       is satisfied. 
 
Id. at 970. Here, it is clear that the required scienter was 
never established. Although the defendants clearly intended 
to seriously harm or kill Eddie Romero, neither their evil 
intent, nor the force they employed in furtherance of it, had 
any nexus to the subsequent taking of his van. The force 
was employed in an attempt to harm Eddie Romero. It was 
not used to take his van. 
 
It is, of course, uncontested that Romero's van was taken 
after he was violently assaulted. But that does not establish 
that the force was used to get control of his van. Even when 
this record is viewed in the light most favorable to the 
government, it is clear that the prosecution failed to 
establish the required nexus between the assault and the 
taking. Rather, the record establishes that the van was 
taken as an afterthought in an attempt to get Romero's 
limp body away from the crime scene. That is not sufficient 
to establish the intent required under S 2119. 
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The carjacking statute reflects Congress' "intent to 
authorize federal prosecutions as a significant deterrent to 
a type of criminal activity that was a matter of national 
concern." Holloway v. United States, ___ U. S. at ___, 119 S. 
Ct. at 970. Congress was concerned about persons who 
used force or intimidation to steal motor vehicles. 
 
The government attempts to argue that the defendants 
took Romero's car in order to transport his body away from 
the crime scene without contaminating their own cars with 
evidence, and that this satisfies the elements ofS 2119. The 
government asserts: 
 
       Without question, the trial evidence . . . would lead a 
       reasonable juror to properly conclude that by no later 
       than . . . when Eddie Romero arrived in front of 
       appellant Romero's residence, both appellants were 
       acting in concert to implement a plan whereby Eddie 
       would be assaulted, thereby giving the appellants 
       control over his van and the means to transport his 
       body from the crime scene. Further, a reasonable jury 
       could well find that, based upon the appellants' 
       background as police officers, they knew that Eddie 
       could not be transported away in their vehicles for fear 
       of contaminating it with blood and other evidence. .. . 
       Accordingly, appellants' assertions that the government 
       failed in its burden of proof should be summarily 
       dismissed. U.S. v. Holloway, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 
       966, 972 (1999) ("The intent requirement of S 2119 is 
       satisfied when the Government proves that at the 
       moment the defendant . . . took control over the 
       driver's automobile the defendant possessed the intent 
       to seriously harm or kill the driver if necessary to steal 
       the car, alternatively, if unnecessary to steal the car.") 
 
Appellee's Br. at 27. However, the government's reliance 
upon Holloway disproves the government's position. It 
simply makes no sense to suggest that Eddie Romero was 
assaulted so that the defendants could transport his body 
away from Lydia Romero's home. The reason the 
defendants assaulted Romero was not to transport his body 
in his own car. Rather, the force was used solely for the 
purpose of bludgeoning Romero. That was the object of the 
assault. It was not the means of stealing his car. After 
 
                                10 
  
defendants accomplished their objective, they dragged 
Romero's unconscious body to his car, and drove away. 
However, under Holloway, unless the threatened or actual 
force is employed in furtherance of the taking of the car, 
there is no carjacking within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 
S 2119. Accordingly, the defendants' conviction for 
carjacking can not stand. 
 
2. Hindering Communication of Information.  
 
Defendants were convicted of hindering the 
communication of information relating to the commission of 
a federal offense in violation of 18 U. S. C. S 1512(b)(3). 
Section 1512(b)(B)(3) provides in pertinent part: 
 
       Whoever . . . corruptly persuades another person, or 
       attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct 
       toward another person, with intent to . . . hinder, 
       delay, or prevent the communication to a law 
       enforcement officer or judge of the United States of 
       information relating to the commission or possible 
       commission of a Federal offense . . . 
 
shall be punished according to the provisions of the 
statute. As noted above, Romero and Applewhaite tried to 
persuade Newton to provide a false alibi for Romero. Both 
defendants now argue that the evidence was not sufficient 
to allow the jury to infer that Newton would provide a false 
alibi to a federal law enforcement officer. However, their 
argument misconstrues the force and breadth of the 
statute. 
 
Here, as noted above, Newton testified that Lydia Romero 
asked him to tell anyone who asked that he spent the night 
with her. Newton further testified that Applewhaite 
telephoned him after Romero's arrest and told him to 
remember what Romero had requested him to say. Thus, 
Newton's testimony is sufficient evidence to allow the jury 
to infer that Applewhaite and Romero agreed to persuade 
Newton to provide false information to law enforcement 
officials. In fact, if Newton's testimony is believed, no other 
inference is possible; and it is obvious from the jury's 
verdict that the jurors did believe Newton. 
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We have previously stated that under S 1512 
 
       the government must prove that at least one of the law- 
       enforcement-officer communications which the 
       defendant sought to prevent would have been with a 
       federal officer, but the government is not obligated to 
       prove that the defendant knew or intended anything 
       with respect to this federal involvement. . . .[T]he 
       government may carry this burden by showing that the 
       conduct which the defendant believed would be 
       discussed in these communications constitutes a 
       federal offense, so long as the government also 
       presents additional appropriate evidence. 
 
United States v. Bell, 113 F.3d 1345, 1349 (3d Cir. 
1997)(internal quotations omitted) (citing United States v. 
Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909, 918 (3d Cir. 1996). In Bell, the 
defendant was convicted in federal court for murdering 
Doreen Proctor. Ms. Proctor had been acting as an 
informant for the Tri-County Drug Task Force, and had 
been scheduled to testify against Bell's boyfriend in state 
court the day of her murder. The Task Force Proctor had 
been cooperating with was developing evidence for use in 
federal as well as state court. Bell was initially acquitted of 
murdering Proctor in state court, but she was thereafter 
tried and convicted in federal court for witness tampering in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1512(a)(1)(A) based upon her 
involvement with Doreen Proctor's murder. 
 
One of her arguments on appeal from her federal 
conviction was that the evidence was insufficient to 
establish that she intended to interfere with a federal 
proceeding. She asserted that the evidence against her 
showed that Proctor had only been involved in a state 
investigation and prosecution. Thus, according to Bell, 
"there was no federal proceeding contemplated at the time 
of Proctor's murder." Id. at 1348, and she therefore did not 
interfere with a federal witness within the meaning of 
S 1512. Bell insisted that, although federal officers had 
been involved in the Task Force investigation, "there was no 
evidence that Proctor had been providing information to a 
federal officer or to an officer authorized to act on behalf of 
the federal government." Id. Accordingly, we had to 
determine if the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to 
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allow the jury to conclude that "at least one of the law- 
enforcement-officer communications that Bell intended to 
prevent would have been with a federal officer." Id. We held 
that it was. 
 
In doing so, we relied upon "the statute's clear command 
that the government need not prove any `state of mind' on 
the part of the defendant with respect to the federal 
character of the proceeding or officer." Id. at 1349. We 
concluded that the statute only requires proof that the 
"officers with whom the defendant believed the victim might 
communicate would in fact be federal officers." Id. 
Similarly, here, the evidence showed that the defendants 
attempted to influence the testimony available to law 
enforcement officers. The government did not have to 
establish that the defendants specifically intended to 
interfere with a federal investigation. All that S 1512(b)(B)(3) 
requires is that the government establish that the 
defendants had the intent to influence an investigation that 
happened to be federal. 
 
Although we conclude that the prosecution failed to 
establish a "carjacking" under federal law, that does not 
necessarily place defendants' conduct beyond the reach of 
S 1512. In Bell we noted that "[i]f an offense constitutes a 
federal crime, it is more likely that an officer investigating 
it would be a federal officer, but an offense's status as a 
federal crime has no relationship with the defendant's 
subjective belief about the individual investigating it." Id. at 
1349. Similarly, a defendant's subjective state of mind has 
no relationship to whether or not the government will be 
able to prove that the defendant's conduct violates a 
substantive federal law. One who attempts to corruptly 
influence an investigation takes his or her witnesses and 
investigations as he or she finds them. Thus, if the 
investigation or prosecution a defendant tries to hamper 
turns out to be federal, the witness is guilty of tampering 
with a federal witness even if the prosecution is unable to 
establish the facts necessary to establish a violation of 
federal law. The statute clearly states that it prohibits an 
attempt to "hinder, . . the communication . . . of 
information relating to the commission or possible 
commission," of a federal offense. When the government 
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charges a defendant with violating federal law, but fails to 
prove the defendant's guilt, a communication about that 
prosecution or investigation is clearly one that concerns a 
"possible" violation of federal law. 
 
It is the integrity of the process, and the safety of those 
involved in it that Congress was seeking to protect in 
enacting S 1512. A federal prosecution remains federal in 
character for purposes of the umbrella of S 1512 even if it 
is in federal court only by accident or mistake. The issue of 
whether authorities are correct when they select a federal 
forum over a state forum does not alter the federal nature 
of the prosecutions brought in federal court insofar as a 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1512 is concerned. 
 
Here, the evidence clearly showed that the defendants 
attempted to persuade Newton to give false information in 
an investigation that was prosecuted in federal court. 
Consequently, we will affirm the convictions for hindering 
communication of information to a federal officer under 18 
U.S.C. S 1512(b)(B)(3). 
 
3. Destruction of Evidence. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 1512(b)(2) provides in pertinent part that it is 
illegal for anyone to intentionally "alter, destroy, mutilate, 
or conceal an object with intent to impair the object's 
integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding." 18 
U. S. C. S 1512(b)(2)(B) defines an "official proceeding" as 
 
       a proceeding before a judge or court of the United 
       States, a United States magistrate, a bankruptcy judge, 
       a judge of the United States Tax Court, a special trial 
       judge of the Tax Court, a judge of the United States 
       Claims Court, or a Federal grand jury; . . . . 
 
Here, Count 4 of the superseding indictment charges 
Romero and Applewhaite with intentionally causing another 
person to destroy evidence to be used in an official 
proceeding by persuading someone to paint over the blood 
that had splattered onto the stone wall in front of Lydia 
Romero's house. The defendants assert different reasons in 
arguing that there is insufficient evidence to sustain their 
convictions for the destruction of evidence. 
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Lydia Romero argues that the government presented 
absolutely no evidence "that Romero persuaded or 
attempted to persuade anybody to destroy evidence." 
Romero's Br. at 25. We disagree. The Hepburns testified 
that they saw Romero and a young Spanish or Puerto Rican 
male painting the stone wall on the morning of April 20th. 
They also testified that the wall had never been painted 
during the preceding 18 years. Forensic analysis later 
disclosed blood on the wall and in the soil abutting the 
wall, and the parties stipulated that it was Eddie Romero's 
blood. The jury could rely upon that evidence to reasonably 
conclude that Romero persuaded the young male to paint 
the wall in order to "impair the [wall's] integrity or 
availability for use in an official proceeding." 
 
Applewhaite argues that the government has produced no 
facts from which the jury could reasonably conclude that 
"their actions might impair an objects (sic) use in a federal 
proceeding." Applewhaite's Br. at 27. We disagree for the 
reasons set forth in our discussion of United States v. Bell, 
Supra. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to 
convict both defendants for destruction of evidence under 
18 U.S.C. S 1512. The jury could reasonably infer that the 
defendants persuaded the young male to paint the stone 
wall in order to destroy evidence to be used in an official 
proceeding. Consequently, the defendants' convictions for 
the destruction of evidence will be affirmed.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The government has not produced any evidence by which the jury 
could reasonably conclude that Applewhaite had any part in specifically 
persuading the young male to paint the stone wall. Consequently, 
Applewhaite's liability for the destruction of evidence is co-
conspirator's 
liability. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U. S. 640 (1946). However, 
Applewhaite does not argue that he cannot be liable as a co-conspirator 
where there is no evidence of a specific agreement to destroy evidence, 
and where there is no evidence that he played any part in the 
commission of the substantive crime of destruction of evidence. 
Accordingly, we need not decide if the government proved that the 
destruction of evidence was within the scope of the conspiracy. Id. at 
647-48. 
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IV. REVERSAL OF THE CARJACKING CONVICTION 
DOES NOT AFFECT THE CONSPIRACY CONVICTION.  
 
Even though we conclude that the prosecution did not 
prove the defendant guilty of carjacking -the first alleged 
object of the charged conspiracy- we hold that the evidence 
was nevertheless sufficient to sustain the defendants' 
conviction for conspiracy. 
 
Where three different crimes are alleged as objects of a 
conspiracy, a conviction for conspiracy will be upheld if 
there is "sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that [the alleged conspirators] 
knowingly and intentionally committed acts furthering any 
of the three objects of the conspiracy [absent circumstances 
not present here]." United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 
1201-1202 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Griffin v. United States, 
502 U. S. 465, 56-57 (1991)("[W]hen a jury returns a guilty 
verdict on an indictment charging several acts in the 
conjunctive, . . . , the verdict stands if the evidence is 
sufficient with respect to any one of the acts.") (citation 
omitted)). The government met its burden as to the charged 
violations of 18 U.S.C. S 1512, and those crimes were 
charged as objects of a conspiracy under 18 U.S.C.S 371. 
Accordingly, the defendants' conspiracy convictions will be 
upheld. 
 
V. TERRITORIAL CONVICTIONS. 
 
A. Attempted First Degree Murder. 
 
Appellants' penultimate argument is that there was 
insufficient evidence to support their convictions for 
attempted first degree murder and aiding and abetting 
under 14 V. I. C. SS 922, 3316 and 11. Applewhaite argues 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. 14 V. I. C. S 331 provides: 
 
       Whoever unsuccessfully attempts to commit an offense, shall, 
       unless otherwise specially prescribed by this Code or other law, be 
       punished by-- 
 
       (1) imprisonment for not more than 25 years, if the offense 
       attempted is punishable by imprisonment for life; or 
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that there was insufficient evidence to allow the jury to find 
premeditation, and Romero argues the evidence was 
insufficient to allow the jury to conclude that she played 
any part in the attempted murder of her husband. 
 
Virgin Islands criminal law distinguishes betweenfirst 
and second degree murder as follows: "All murder which 
. . . is perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, torture 
or any other kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated 
killing . . . is murder in the first degree. . . . All other kinds 
of murder are murder in the second degree." 14 V. I. C. 
S 922. As we explained in Government of the Virgin Islands 
v. Roldan, 612 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1979): 
 
       To premeditate a killing is to conceive the design or 
       plan to kill. . . . A deliberate killing is one which has 
       been planned and reflected upon by the accused and is 
       committed in a cool state of the blood, not in sudden 
       passion engendered by just cause of provocation. . .. 
       It is not required, however, that the accused shall have 
       brooded over his plan to kill or entertained it for any 
       considerable period of time. Although the mental 
       processes involved must take place prior to the killing, 
       a brief moment of thought may be sufficient to form a 
       fixed, deliberate design to kill. . . . 
 
Id. at 781 (quoting Government of the Virgin Islands v. Lake, 
362 F.2d 770, 776 (3d Cir. 1966). "[A] brief moment of 
deliberation can suffice," Government of the Virgin Islands v. 
Charles, 72 F.3d 401, 410 (3d Cir. 1995), to establish the 
premeditation required for first degree murder. Moreover, 
the law recognizes the near impossibility of proving one's 
state of mind by direct evidence. Accordingly, one's mental 
state is ordinarily determined from the circumstances 
surrounding a killing. Charles, 72 F.3d at 410 
("premeditation can generally be proved only by 
circumstantial evidence.") 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       (2) in any other case, imprisonment for not more than one-half of 
       the maximum term, or fine of not more than one-half of the 
       maximum sum prescribed by law for the commission of the offense 
       attempted, or by both such fine and imprisonment. 
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       If premeditation is found it must ordinarily be inferred 
       from the objective facts. Every sane man is presumed 
       to intend all the natural and probable consequences 
       flowing from his deliberate acts. . . . Accordingly, if one 
       voluntarily does an act, the direct and natural 
       tendency of which is to destroy another's life, it may 
       fairly be inferred, in the absence of evidence to the 
       contrary, that the destruction of that other's life was 
       intended. 
 
Roldan, 612 F.2d at 781 (citation omitted). In addition, 
under Virgin Islands law one who assists another in the 
commission of a murder is guilty of aiding and abetting and 
is viewed in the same light as the principal who actually 
committed the crime. 14 V. I. C. S 11 provides, in relevant 
part, as follows: 
 
       (a) Whoever commits a crime or offense or aids, abets, 
       counsels, commands, induces or procures its 
       commission, is punishable as a principal. 
 
       (b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if 
       directly performed by him or another person would be 
       a crime or offense, is punishable as a principal. 
 
       (c) Persons within this section shall be prosecuted and 
       tried as principals, and no fact need be alleged in the 
       information against them other than is required in the 
       information against the principal. . . . 
 
Here, the jury inferred that Applewhaite had a 
premeditated plan to kill Eddie Romero. Given the evidence, 
the jury could hardly have inferred anything else; and 
Applewhaite's argument that the evidence was not sufficient 
to support the jury's conclusion approaches frivolity. After 
being summoned to his wife's home, Eddie Romero got out 
of his van and stood unsuspectingly resting against a 
nearby stone wall with his back to Applewhaite. As Eddie 
stood in this position facing his wife, Applewhaite snuck up 
behind him and struck him three times with a baseball bat. 
Not satisfied with the severe injuries the bat inflicted, 
Applewhaite thereafter shot Romero at close-range on two 
separate occasions. As noted above, we fail to see how any 
reasonable jury could conclude that Applewhaite did not 
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intend to kill Eddie Romero. He clearly had a premeditated 
plan to do so.7 
 
Lydia Romero was part of that plan. In fact, the 
 847<!>circumstantial evidence, including her relationship to 
 
Eddie, supports an inference that it was her plan to begin 
with even though Applewhaite was the actual assailant. 
However, whether the plan was conceived by Applewhaite 
or Lydia is irrelevant. It is clear that Lydia aided and 
abetted Applewhaite in his use of force, and she was 
properly convicted for doing so. Lydia lured Romero to her 
house so that Applewhaite could attack him from behind, 
and Applewhaite did just that. When Eddie Romero got out 
of his van, Lydia Romero was waiting outside in the front 
yard of her home. She told Eddie Romero to wait outside 
the stone wall until she penned the dogs; however, she 
made no move to pen them. Instead, she remained in place, 
staring at her husband while Applewhaite approached from 
behind with bat in hand. From these facts, the jury could 
reasonably conclude that Lydia Romero summoned Eddie 
to her home and then deliberately diverted her husband's 
attention so that Applewhaite could ambush him from 
behind. As noted above, Eddie Romero's survival is due to 
his good fortune, and the Keystone Cop-like manner in 
which the defendants executed their plan. However, it is 
not because Applewhaite and Lydia did not intend to kill 
him. 
 
Accordingly, the defendants' conviction for attempted first 
degree murder will be affirmed. 
 
B. Kidnapping. 
 
The Virgin Islands kidnapping statute provides, in 
relevant part, as follows: 
 
       Whoever without lawful authority confines another 
       person . . . against his will, or confines or inveigles or 
       kidnaps another person, with intent to cause him to be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Applewhaite argues there is no evidence of premeditation because he 
claims that he hit Eddie Romero in defense of Lydia Romero and that the 
shootings were accidental. However, the jury did not believe Applewhaite. 
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       confined or imprisoned . . . against his will . . . is guilty 
       of kidnapping . . . . 
 
14 V. I. C. S 1051. Applewhaite argues that the evidence 
was insufficient to allow the jury to find that Eddie Romero 
was intentionally confined against his will. 
 
After beating Eddie Romero into unconsciousness, 
Applewhaite, put Romero's body into Romero's van, and 
drove away, apparently while wearing latex gloves. When 
Romero later regained consciousness inside the van he was 
greeted with bullets from the gun that Applewhaite was 
holding on him while driving the van. All of this followed a 
struggle in which Eddie Romero apparently tried to wrest 
control of the steering wheel and/or gun away from 
Applewhaite. Applewhaite insists that he did not knowingly 
confine Romero against his will because his only intent in 
placing Romero in the van was to take him to the hospital. 
That of course was a credibility question that the jury 
resolved against Applewhaite. Apparently, the jury 
concluded that after clubbing Romero from behind with a 
baseball bat, slipping into his latex driving gloves then 
shooting him at point blank range when he regained 
consciousness; Applewhaite's planned itinerary for Romero 
did not include the local hospital. That is a reasonable 
inference. 
 
Lydia Romero argues that there is no evidence from 
which the jury could conclude that she played any part in 
kidnapping her husband. Again, we disagree. Romero's 
liability for the kidnapping is as an aider and abetter. The 
jury could reasonably find that Applewhaite and Romero's 
plan included doing something to dispose of Eddie's body 
after killing him. The jury could further conclude that the 
"something" that the assailants had decided upon was 
stuffing Romero into his own van and transporting him 
away from the front of Lydia's home, and that Lydia's 
involvement in this scheme certainly furthered Romero's 
abduction. Indeed, as noted above, she was the one who 
lured him into position. Moreover, the Hepburns' testimony 
about hearing Lydia's van drive off and then return 
certainly an inference that she followed Applewhaite as he 
took Eddie away, and then gave Applewhaite a ride back to 
 
                                20 
  
her home after he abandoned the van with Eddie inside of 
it. 
 
Consequently, we will affirm the defendants' convictions 
for kidnapping. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION. 
 
To summarize: we will affirm defendants' convictions for 
the federal charges of conspiracy, hindering the 
communication of information relating to the commission of 
a federal offense, and destruction of evidence to be used in 
an official proceeding. We also affirm the territorial 
convictions for attempted first degree murder and 
kidnapping. However, we will reverse the convictions for 
carjacking and remand for resentencing.8  
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Originally, Applewhaite was sentenced to a term of incarceration of 60 
months on Count 1; 264 months on Count 2; 120 months on Count 3; 
120 months on Count 4; 20 years on Count 5 and 10 years on Count 6, 
with Counts 1, 3 and 4 to run concurrently with Count 2 and Counts 5 
and 6 to run concurrently with Counts 1, 2, 3 and 4. Romero was 
sentenced to 60 months on Count 1; 300 months on Count 2; 120 
months on Count 3; 120 months on Count 4; 20 years on Count 5; and 
10 years on Count 6 with Counts 1, 3 and 4 to run concurrently with 
Count 2 and Counts 5 and 6 to run concurrently with Counts 1, 2, 3 
and 4. 
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